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City of Arlington v. FCC: 
Questioning an Agency's Authority to Determine Its Own Jurisdiction 
 
by 
 
Jonathan H. Adler * 
 
A dispute between the Federal Communications Commission and local governments 
over the Commission’s authority over local zoning applications could produce the most 
significant administrative law decision in a decade. In January, the Supreme Court will 
hear oral arguments in City of Arlington v. FCC, in which the Court will decide whether 
courts should defer to an agency’s determination of its own jurisdiction. Although the 
need for courts to defer to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions 
under Chevron v. NRDC is well-established, the Supreme Court has never decided 
whether so-called Chevron deference should apply to statutory provisions delineating 
the scope of agency jurisdiction. 
 
Section 332(c)(7) of the Communications Act seeks to balance the need for regulatory 
uniformity to promote mobile telecommunications services with state and local control 
over zoning decisions. Section 332(c)(7)(a) of the Act contains a savings clause 
providing that state and local authority to regulate “placement, construction, and 
modification of personal wireless service facilities” is only limited to the extent the Act 
expressly provides.1 Section 332(c)(7)(b) goes on to place limits on state and local 
authority to deny permits for the placement or modification of personal wireless service 
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facilities and requires state and local authorities to respond to permitting requests and 
the like within a “reasonable” period of time, among other things.2 
 
In a 2009 Declaratory Ruling the FCC interpreted Section 332(c)(7)(b) to limit the 
grounds upon which local permitting authorities could deny permits for wireless facilities 
and require state and local governments to act upon siting permits within a set period of 
time.3 Several local governments sued to challenge the FCC’s interpretation, arguing 
the Commission had acted beyond the scope of its power in construing Section 
332(c)(7)(b). Specifically, they argued the relevant provisions were enacted to limit the 
FCC’s jurisdiction, and could not be interpreted by the FCC to preempt local regulation. 
 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the FCC’s interpretation.4 Finding 
the relevant provisions in the Communications Act ambiguous, the Fifth Circuit deferred 
to the FCC’s interpretation. This was not an ordinary application of the Chevron 
doctrine, however. As the Fifth Circuit noted, at issue was the scope of the FCC’s 
regulatory jurisdiction – specifically whether the FCC had the authority to administer 
Section 332(c)(7) and define the limits this provision places on state and local 
governments. 
 
Whether Chevron applies in such circumstances remains an open question the 
Supreme Court has yet to address directly, let alone resolve.5 Prior Fifth Circuit 
decisions suggested such deference was appropriate, however.6 So the court deferred 
to the FCC’s conclusion Section 332(c)(7) conferred the Commission with regulatory 
authority to define the limitations imposed on state and local government authority. As 
the court explained, because the statute did not “unambiguously preclude” the FCC 
from exercising such authority, the law was sufficiently ambiguous for the FCC to have 
its way. 
 
The Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in City of Arlington v. FCC is limited to the 
question of whether a court should apply Chevron deference to review an agency’s 
determination of its own jurisdiction. This is an important question that has divided the 
circuit courts of appeals for many years. It is also one that should yield a decision that 
Chevron deference should not apply. Whatever the substantive or policy merits of the 
FCC’s 2009 Declaratory Order, there are several reasons to conclude the Fifth Circuit’s 
grant of deference to the FCC’s determination of its own jurisdiction was inappropriate. 
Questions regarding an agency’s jurisdiction are not properly part of Chevron’s 
domain.7 
 
Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council set forth a now-familiar two-step 
inquiry for courts to undertake when evaluating agency interpretations of federal 
statutes.8 First, the reviewing court considers the statutory text to determine “whether 
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”9 If so, the statute 
controls, “for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously 
expressed intent of Congress.”10 On the other hand, if the reviewing court concludes 
that the statute is “silent or ambiguous,” the court must defer to the agency’s statutory 
interpretation, so long as it “is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”11 At 
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this second step, the agency’s interpretation is given “controlling weight” unless it is 
“arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”12 This is so even if the 
agency adopts a different interpretation than that which would have been favored by the 
court. 
 
Chevron deference does not apply in all situations in which a court is presented with a 
federal agency’s interpretation of a potentially ambiguous federal statute, however. The 
statute in question must be one the agency is entrusted to administer. So, for example, 
the Environmental Protection Agency will receive deference when interpreting 
ambiguous provisions of the Clean Water Act and Clean Air Act, but the Department of 
Defense will not, even when these laws are applied to military activities. 
 
While ambiguity is necessary to trigger the deference Chevron prescribes in step-two, it 
is not sufficient.13 As the Supreme Court has made clear in subsequent cases, Chevron 
deference is based upon a delegation of interpretive authority from Congress to federal 
agencies.14 Absent such delegation, there is no basis to defer. Thus, the Court has 
explained, Chevron deference is due only “when it appears that Congress delegated 
authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the 
agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that 
authority.”15 
 
Chevron and its progeny have made clear that the reason for deference is not that 
federal agencies have inherent authority to fill gaps and resolve ambiguities in federal 
statutes, but rather that Congress often delegates to agencies such authority. This only 
makes sense for, as the Court has emphasized time and again, federal agencies have 
no inherent authority to prescribe rules or standards governing private activity.16 This 
applies to executive agencies and independent agencies alike. 
 
The primary reason courts should not confer Chevron deference to agency 
interpretations of statutes that define or limit an agency’s jurisdiction is implicit in the 
Chevron doctrine itself. The conferral of Chevron deference is premised upon the 
existence of agency jurisdiction. If there is no jurisdiction, there is no deference. So 
before a court can even consider whether an agency should receive deference for its 
statutory interpretation, it must first assure itself that agency jurisdiction exists. Put 
another way, the question of whether Congress has delegated authority to a federal 
agency – authority that may include the power to construe ambiguous statutory 
provisions – is prior to the question of whether a given agency interpretation may be 
due Chevron deference. 
 
One reason Congress delegates agencies the authority to interpret ambiguous statutory 
provisions is because federal agencies often have a degree of field-specific knowledge 
and expertise that Congress lacks. Officials at the Federal Communications 
Commission, for example, presumably know more about the details of communications 
policy than does the average member of Congress. The FCC employs economic and 
technical experts who specialize in the sorts of questions the FCC is tasked to address. 
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Whatever comparative advantage federal agencies may have in addressing technical or 
policy questions within their bailiwick of expertise, agencies have no such comparative 
advantage on matters of jurisdiction. Courts, by contrast, are called upon to address 
jurisdictional questions all the time. Courts, not agencies, have the comparative 
advantage in resolving matters of jurisdiction. 
 
Whether Congress conferred jurisdiction to a given agency to address a particular 
concern is a matter of statutory interpretation of the sort courts are regularly required to 
address. Indeed, the Administrative Procedure Act itself tasks federal courts with the 
responsibility to decide “all relevant questions of law” and set aside those agency 
actions courts find to be “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or 
short of statutory right.17 
 
Granting Chevron deference to agency interpretations of their own jurisdiction also 
creates the risk of agency self-aggrandizement. As Cass Sunstein has observed, “In 
Anglo-American law, those limited by law are generally not empowered to decide on the 
meaning of the limitation.”18 The concern is that if an agency is entrusted with the 
authority to determine the scope of its own jurisdiction it may extend its authority beyond 
the limits Congress envisioned.19 Not only is it unlikely that Congress will delegate 
authority to an agency to determine the scope of its own authority without making such 
an intention clear, the grant of such authority poses distinct risks given that agencies 
only exercise that authority which they have been delegated in the first place. 
 
Whether local land-use and zoning regulations unduly inhibit the placement of mobile 
service facilities may well be a question about which the FCC has substantial expertise. 
Yet whether Congress delegated the FCC authority to address this question is not. 
Questions of agency jurisdiction are legally and analytically antecedent to the question 
of whether a given agency interpretation is one to which Chevron deference is due. In 
City of Arlington the Supreme Court has the opportunity to clarify this point. There are 
good reasons for it to make clear that agencies should only receive Chevron deference 
when they are exercising that authority Congress has delegated, and they should not 
receive deference when facing the question of whether the agency has authority at all. 
 
*  Jonathan H. Adler is a member of the Free State Foundation’s Board of Academic 
Advisors  and the Johan Verheij Memorial Professor of Law and Director of the Center 
for Business Law and Regulation at the Case Western Reserve University School of 
Law. 
 
The Free State Foundation is a nonpartisan, Section 501(c)(3) free market-oriented 
think tank located in Rockville, Maryland.
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Chevron Deference, Agency Jurisdiction, and Statutory Silences, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1497 (2009).  
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